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Supplementary Methods
1 Methods
Subjects: Sixteen Caltech undergraduate and graduate students were recruited from the Cal-
tech Social Science Experimental Laboratory database to participate in the study (13 males,
3 females). The mean (std. dev.) age was 23.5 years (6.2). Informed consent was obtained
using a consent form approved by the Internal Review Board at Caltech. Subjects read written
instructions before entering the scanner (included at the end of the supplements). After reading
the instructions they completed a quiz to ensure comprehension of how their decisions affected
their performance and earnings. They knew that at the end of the experiment, one trial from
each of the three treatments would be chosen at random, and their choice on that trial would
determine their pay. Their earnings were the total from the three randomly-chosen choices, plus
$5 fee for participating.
Behavioral task: Stimuli were presented through MRI compatible goggles (Resonance Tech-
nology). Choices were made using an MRI-compatible button box. For each choice, three
options were given. Two of the options were bets on either side of a binary choice gamble that
carried some uncertainty of paying either a positive sum or zero. The third option was the sure
payoff that paid a certain positive amount of money. Subjects were allowed as much time as
they desired in making their choice. Responses were made by pressing the button corresponding
to the location of the options (left-middle-right) on the screen.
The gambles were not played after each trial because then the degree of ambiguity would
change over time as subjects learned from feedback about the event probabilities.
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Card-deck treatment: In the Card-Deck treatment, subjects take the sure payoff, or bet on
either red or black card. The cards are blue in the presentation because the background
was black, but conventional red and black playing cards were used to determine the actual
payoff after the subject came out of the scanner. Subjects knew blue and black were
equivalent. Full list of stimuli are presented in Table S1.
Knowledge treatment: In the Knowledge treatment, subjects could take the sure payoff, or
bet on whether the answer was Yes or No to the statement presented. Full list of stimuli
are presented in Table S2.
Informed Opponents treatment: In the Informed opponents treatment, subjects either take
the sure payoff, or bet that a red or black card would be drawn. If they choose the bet,
they play against an opponent that will sample from the an ambiguous deck the number
of cards indicated on the screen.
If the colors of the cards chosen by the subject and his/her opponent match, the bet does
not take place and both earn the sure payoff instead. If the colors mismatch, the bet takes
place, and the subject whose card matches the color of the card randomly chosen from the
deck, wins the amount indicated on the screen, with the other subject earning 0.
Note that because the opponent chooses a color after seeing a sample of cards, the opponent
always has more information than the subject, in the “low-information” condition where
one or more cards are drawn. For example, if the scanned subject chooses to bet on red,
then her bet only counts if the informed opponent bet black (because she saw that more of
the drawn cards were black than red. Thus, the scanned subject is always betting on the
opposite of the color which was most common in the 3-card sample or, equivalently, the
scanned subject is always betting on the less likely color (this is called “adverse selection”
in economics). The scanned subjects should be averse to betting against the informed
opponent. In the 0-draw case both players have the same information so there is no
rational reason to dislike betting. Full list of stimuli are presented in Table S3.
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Table S4 shows mean response times across conditions and treatments. Because response
times are skewed and bounded away from zero, standard deviations are large and misleading
about distributional variance. Figure S1 therefore displays boxplots of the log response times
of choices by type of choice, condition, and treatment. These boxplots show that there are no
significant differences in the central tendency of response times between any of these variables.
The proportion of choices of the certain payoff for each question is presented in Tables S1-3.
Summary of the proportion of choices made by subjects are presented in Figure S2 and Table S5.
Roughly speaking, a greater number of certain choice indicates greater ambiguity/risk aversion.
A more rigorous demonstration of ambiguity/risk aversion is presented in Section 1.1.
The fMRI analysis used 16 subjects. All 16 completed the Card-Deck and Knowledge treat-
ments, and 13 completed the Informed Opponent Treatment (which always came last). The
order of treatments was fixed across trials. Order was not counterbalanced because the deck in
the Informed Opponents treatment is the same as the ambiguous deck in the Card-Deck treat-
ment. Presenting the Informed Opponents Treatment before the Card-Deck treatment might
introduce a “hierarchy” of uncertainty that we did not wish to introduce to the experiment.
Each treatment is composed of 48 trials in each of the three treatments, 24 ambiguous and
24 risky. Trials are presented in blocks consisted of four ambiguous or four risky trials in order,
alternated with blocks of the opposite type. After each decision, the stimulus remained onscreen
for 2 seconds, followed by a fixation cross for 4-8 secs (randomized) before the next stimulus
presentation.
1.1 Behavioral data analysis
A parametric analysis to estimate risk and ambiguity was conducted via a nonlinear stochastic
choice model.
Subject’s utility functions for money are assumed to follow a power function u(x, ρ) = xρ,
which is conveniently characterized by one parameter and widely used in empirical estimation
of this sort. Subjects are assumed to weight probabilities according to the function pi(p, γ) = pγ .
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The ρ parameter is interpreted as the risk aversion coefficient, i.e., the curvature of the utility
function. The γ parameter is interpreted as the ambiguity aversion coefficient, i.e., how much
do people over(under)-weight probabilities because they are not confident in their judgments.
If subjects over-weight ambiguous probabilities (γ < 1), we characterize them as ambiguity-
preferring. If they under-weight ambiguous probabilities (γ > 1), we characterize them as
ambiguity-averse.
If subjects weight probabilities linearly (γ = 1), we characterize them as ambiguity-neutral.
We assume subjects combine these weighted-probabilities and utilities linearly, so that their
weighted subjective expected utility is U(p, x, γ, ρ) = pi(p, γ)u(x, ρ).
The tasks are binary choices in which subjects either choose a gamble to win x (with proba-
bility p) or 0, or a certain payoff c. For the risky deck, the ratios of the cards are the probabilities.
For the ambiguous decks and all knowledge questions, we assumed p = 1/2. If subjective p is
different than 1/2 (e.g., because a subject happens to know a lot about fall temperatures in
New York), then subjective probabilities are not held constant across the knowledge trials. This
possibility biases our analysis against finding common regions of activation across treatments,
so would imply that the results described in the text are conservative about the true extent and
commonality of ambiguity and risk-specific regions. We constrain γ = 1 in all risk conditions
and estimate γ from behavioral data in the ambiguity conditions (S1 ).
The probability that the subject chooses the gamble rather than the sure amount c is given
by the logit or softmax formula, P (p, x, c, γ, ρ) = 1/(1+ exp{−λ(U(p, x, γ, ρ)−u(c, ρ))}), where
λ is the sensitivity of choice probability to the utility difference (the degree of inflection), or
the amount of “randomness” in the subject’s choices (λ = 0 means choices are random; as λ
increases the function is more steeply inflected at zero).
Denote the choice of the subject in trial i to be yi, where yi = 1 if subject chooses the
gamble, and 0 if the certain payoff.
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We fit the data using maximum likelihood, with the log likelihood function
48∑
i=1
yi log(P (pi, xi, ci, γ, ρ, λ)) + (1− yi) log(1− P (pi, xi, ci, γ, ρ, λ)).
Because this is a nonlinear optimization problem, numerical methods must be used. We used
the Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm implemented in Mathematica v5.1(S3 ), with 10 random
starting positions. The iteration with the highest likelihood value was chosen. Table S6 shows
the estimates from the fMRI subjects.
2 FMRI acquisition
Imaging was performed using a 3 Tesla Siemens Trio scanner at the Broad Imaging Center at
Caltech. A set of high-resolution (0.5mm x 0.5mm x 1.0mm) T1-weighted anatomical images
was first acquired to enable localization of functional images. Whole-brain functional images
were acquired in 32-34 axial slices (64 x 64 voxels; in plane resolution 3 mm x 3 mm x 3.5 mm
slices) at a TR of 2000 msec, TE of 30 msec.
The scan sequences were axial slices approximately parallel to the AC-PC axis. Scan se-
quences were not optimized for the OFC, therefore susceptibility artifacts affected adversely the
image quality of the medial OFC. The lateral OFC activation found in the experiment, however,
is sufficiently distant to the signal dropout regions as to not be adversely affected.
Prior to analysis, the images were corrected for slice time artifacts, realigned, coregistered to
the subject’s T1 image, normalized to Montreal Neurological Institute coordinates (resampled
4mm x 4mm x 4mm), and smoothed with an 8mm full-width-at-half-maximum Gaussian kernel
using SPM2 (S4 ). At the start of each functional scanning run, the screen remained black for
4s to allow time for magnetization to reach steady state. The associated first two images were
discarded from the analysis. Thirteen out of 16 subjects completed all tasks within three 15-
minute scanning runs. However, the duration of the experiment was variable because choices
were self-paced. Three subjects did not have time to complete the Informed Opponent treatment.
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3 FMRI Analysis
The general linear model (GLM) and random effects analyses presented in Figures 1 and 2 were
performed using SPM2 (S4 ). For each treatment, two regressors were included to identify the
risk and ambiguity regions. Each regressor modeled the entire duration of the trial. A third
regressor was defined at the time of decision, which controlled for motor responses.
Each regressor was generated by convolving a canonical hemodynamic response with a
dummy variable that equaled 1 during the ambiguity (risk) trial (from onset to decision), and 0
for all other points.
The regressors were anchored to stimulus presentation based on the hypothesis that the
reaction to uncertainty would occur between stimulus onset and the time of decision, rather
than afterwards as a result of the decision (since there is no feedback after each trial). We did
not include onset and decision epochs for both ambiguity and risk in the model because the
parameters then become unidentified due to multicollinearity.
Each subject thus generated the set of contrasts ambiguity>risk and risk> ambiguity for
each treatment, for a total of 6 contrasts. A one-way ANOVA was conducted in SPM2 to find
the areas of joint significance, correcting for non-sphericity due to repeated measures. That is,
we pooled all of the ambiguity>risk contrasts, and conducted a t-test on whether the average
response in the three treatments were significantly greater than 0. The same procedure was used
for the risk>ambiguity contrast.
Results are reported for brain areas that are significant at p < 0.001 uncorrected and cluster
size k ≥ 10. An exclusive mask was used to exclude voxels that are significantly different between
the three sessions (p < 0.01). The rationale for this exclusion is that voxels/regions significantly
different across the three treatments suggests that they do not perform the same function (S5 ).
The impact of the exclusive mask had negligible qualitative effect on the data. The only
notable effect was in reducing the corrected p-value through reducing the search volume of the
brain (because of exclusion of voxels). Uncorrected p-values, of course, were unaffected.
Table S7 presents fMRI results for the ambiguity>risk model. Table S8 presents results for
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the risk>ambiguity model. Figures S3-S4 show the HRF’s of percentage signal change in these
two contrasts for each of the three tasks separately, to show the robustness of the effect across
tasks.
3.1 Decision-epoch synched model
A model with regressors anchored to the decision epoch was also estimated for all subjects.
This provides a robustness check on our assumption that the hemodynamic responses in our
regions were synced to the onset of the stimulus, rather than that of the decision. Results from
this model showed similar activation in the dorsal striatum for the risk > ambiguity contrast,
but did not show differences in the amygdala or lateral OFC (Fig. S5). It is clear from the
hemodynamic responses in Figure 2B and 3B why this is so. The activations in the OFC and
amygdala occur at the beginning of the trial, and peaks before the decision epoch. The striatal
activity occurs somewhere between the onset and the decision, which allows it to be captured
by the decision-synched model.
3.2 Choice-dependent regions
Tables S9-S10 present all regions differentially activated under gamble and certain payoff choices
(p < 0.001 uncorrected, k ≥ 10 voxels). In addition to contralateral visual and motor activations,
corresponding to the visual inputs and motor responses required to make the choices, there were
significant bilateral insula and left ventral striatum activation in the gamble>certain contrast.
This is consistent with previous findings of insular activity in decision making under risk (S7 ).
These regions, however, did not exhibit significant interaction with the ambiguity/risk dis-
tinction. Together with the fact that the risk/ambiguity regions did not exhibit significant
differences across choices, this suggests that the risk/ambiguity regions are indeed responding
to the ambiguity/risk trial dimension (Fig. S6) rather than to gamble/certain choices.
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3.3 Expected reward regions
To identify regions that were sensitive to expected dollar value of rewards, conditional on the
subject’s choice, we used a model where the event of interest was synched to the decision epoch.
Two different main regressors were used for the ambiguity and risk conditions, respectively.
Each regressor was associated with an interaction term defined by the expected dollar value of
the actual choice (either the gamble or the certain payoff). Notice that sometimes the choice
was the certain payoff and sometimes it was the gamble, so this interaction should detect regions
that are sensitive to expected value of the actual choice, regardless of whether it was a certain
or uncertain amount.
Results from this analysis are presented in Table S11-S12. In the Card-Deck treatment,
activity in the right dorsal striatum was correlated with the expected reward in the risk condition.
Activity in left dorsal striatum was correlated with the expected reward in both conditions of
the Knowledge treatment. More importantly, the dorsal striatum regions found in this analysis
also overlapped with the risk> ambiguity regions found in the main analysis. No consistent
activations were found in the Informed Opponents treatment (S8 ).
It is interesting to note that the lateralization corresponds to the semantic/mathematical
lateralization. It is less clear, however, how much of this dissociation is due to the ambiguity/risk
distinction, or the lack of information about the expected reward in the ambiguity condition.
Further research would be needed to establish this relationship.
3.4 Cross-Correlation
Table S13 presents the cross-correlation of contrast values in our regions of interest. The OFC
and amygdala contrast values are from ambiguity-risk contrast and striatum the opposite so
a positive table entry between those areas is a negative correlation. These correlations show
a modest link between amygdala and OFC, and a substantial (negative) correlation between
striatum and OFC (again, the correlations shown are negative but since contrasts are opposite,
should be interpreted as positive). This is consistent with the hypothesis that OFC is judging
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gradations of uncertainty and triggering differential striatal responses.
4 Lesion Data
4.1 Lesion Patient Information
Twelve neurological patients with single, focal, stable, chronic lesions of the brain were chosen
from the Iowa Cognitive Neuroscience Patient Registry such that they were similar in terms of
the etiology of their lesions (surgical resection), and similar on background neuropsychological
measures. We partitioned the patients on the basis of whether or not their lesion overlapped
with the largest and most significant frontal activation focus we found in the fMRI study (Right
lateral OFC, cf. Fig. 2 and Table S7), or whether their lesion did not overlap with any signif-
icantly activated region. These two groups, designated “frontal” and “comparison” consisted,
respectively, of 5 (3 males, 2 females) and 7 patients (4 females, 3 males). The frontal group had
lesions in bilateral OFC and frontal pole (1 patient), right OFC and right insula (1 patient), right
OFC and frontal pole (1 patient) or only right OFC (2 patients) resulting from neurosurgical
resection of brain tumors (frontal meningeoma resection). The comparison group had lesions in
left (3 patients) or right (3 patients) anterolateral temporal cortex, or in left posterior temporal
cortex (1 patient) resulting from neurosurgical resection for the treatment of epilepsy. There
were no significant differences between these groups in the overall size of the lesion.
Summary of behavioral data for these patients are shown in Table S14. All subjects had IQs
in the normal range, had normal memory performance and arithmetic abilities, and were not
aphasic, depressed, or perseverative (Table S15). Frontal-damage patients were not significantly
different than the temporal-damage comparison group except on the PIQ test where frontal
patients scored higher than the temporal comparison group (p < .05).
4.2 Estimation Procedure
The lesion patient choices were part of a larger battery of decision and game tasks.
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In the ambiguity condition, patients were shown an actual card deck with 20 cards, in some
mixture of red and black they could not see. They were given a series of choices between certain
amounts of points (15, 60, 30, 40, 25 in that order) and bets on the color of their choice from
the card deck for 100 points.
To illustrate, an ambiguity- and risk-neutral person would choose from the deck rather than
take the certain amounts 15, 30, 40, or 25, but would take the certain 60 rather than choose
from the deck. In the risky condition they were shown a deck with exactly 10 red and 10 black
cards whose colors they could see. They made choices between a bet on the color of their choice
from the deck for 100 points, or certain amounts of 30, 60, 15, 40, and 25 (in that order).
There are three small differences in this task and the Card-Deck treatment in the fMRI
experiment: (1) There were fewer choices in the lesion experiment, due to time constraints in
conducting experiments with lesion patients and the need for multiple trials to extract fMRI
signal; (2) there was wider range of certain point amounts in the lesion task (in case patients were
extremely risk- and ambiguity-averse or -preferring); and (3) due to human subjects restrictions,
the lesion task choices were not conducted for actual monetary payments. Feature (1) means we
could estimate ρ and γ for each individual in the fMRI study but were forced to pool data within
each patient group for the OFC-comparison analysis. Note that the methodological differences
(1-3) between the fMRI and lesion tasks do not matter for the most important finding from the
lesion task, which is the significant difference between OFCs and the comparison group (Fig. 4).
Data from all subjects were pooled within each group (summary of aggregate data are
presented in Table S14). This yielded 25 choices (from 5 subjects) for the frontal group, and
35 choices (from 7 subjects) for the comparison group. The maximum likelihood estimation
procedures are identical to those discussed above. To derive confidence intervals, a bootstrap
procedure was used with 100 runs: For k-subject groups, a pseudosample consisted of k draws
of different subjects with replacement from the sample. The estimation procedure was than
applied to that pseudosample. One hundred pseudo-samples were drawn for each group (closed
dots in Fig. 4).
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4.3 Estimates
The estimates for lesion patients using the data were (γ = 0.82, ρ = 1.09, λ = 0.10) for frontal
patients, and (γ = 1.23, ρ = 0.74, λ = 0.27) for the comparison group .
Across the 100 pseudo-samples, the bootstrap estimates yielded estimated means (standard
deviations) of γ = 0.88(0.28), ρ = 1.15(0.20), λ = 0.48(1.29) for the frontal patients, and γ =
1.25(0.22), ρ = 0.77(0.11), λ = 0.28(0.16) for the lesion patients.
The only noticeable difference in the pooled estimates, and the central tendencies of the
bootstrapped estimates, is the lower λ for frontals (.10) in the group procedure versus the
bootstrap mean (.48). This reflects the fact that one subject behaved differently than the others
and more randomly across certain-amount x values. Fitting group data including this subject
requires estimation of a relatively low λ. However, in bootstrap runs this outlying subject was
often not selected into the pseudosample, and in those pseudosamples more inflected responses
to x deliver higher λ. The crucial parameter, the ambiguous probability discount γ, is quite
close in the two types of estimation however, and is close to the ambiguity-neutral value of 1.
5 Related Literature in Social Science
In the paper we refer to several areas of social science that incorporate ambiguity aversion.
For economics and politics see (S9 ); macroeconomic policy-making (S10 ); wage-setting and
contracting (S11, S12 ); strategic thinking (S13, S14 ); voting (S15 ); and financial investment
(S16, S17 ). Because the literature is large, we focus next only on two practical examples that
clearly illustrate the nature of how ambiguity-aversion might influence practice (in law) and its
potential economic importance (in finance).
Scottish law has a “not proven” verdict, along with “guilty” and “not guilty” verdicts.
According to Peter Duff (S18 ), “the difference is that the verdict of ‘not guilty’ is thought to
mean that the accused definitely did not commit the crime, that is, it is a positive declaration of
innocence, whereas the verdict of ‘not proven’ is thought to imply solely that the accused’s guilt
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has not been conclusively demonstrated” (p. 193). The “not proven” and “not guity” verdicts
have the same legal implications, because both prohibit retrial even in the face of new evidence.
Not proven verdicts are returned in about a third of jury trials, typically when the jury thinks
the defendant is actually guilty but cannot legally convict because of a lack of corroborating
evidence required by Scottish law (e.g., in sexual assault where only the victim is a witness to
the crime). The Scottish “not proven” verdict expresses the two dimensions of evidence noted by
Keynes–when the “weight of the evidence” is light, a verdict of ”not proven”, and the traditional
guilty and not guilty verdicts reflect the implications of weighty evidence.
One practical economic consequence of ambiguity-aversion is home bias—the tendency for
investors in most countries to invest heavily in stocks from their home country and very little
in stocks from foreign countries. The reluctance to hold foreign stocks amounts to a sacrifice
in annual percentage return of 1-2% per year (S19 ) according to one estimate. Assuming an
average unbiased return of 7% (S20 ), a person with home bias who invests a lump sum at age
25 will end up with only half as much money at age 65 as an investor who is unbiased
Home bias is large and pervasive: In 1989 American, Japanese, and British investors held
94%, 98%, and 82% of their investments in home-country stocks (S19 ) even though the latter
two markets account for only a modest fraction of the world portfolio. Home bias also exists
at many levels: Portfolio managers prefer to invest in companies with headquarters nearby,
individuals preferred their own regional “baby Bell” companies after the breakup of AT&T,
workers invest too heavily in the stock of the companies they work for, and investors in many
countries prefer to invest in nearby companies or those whose managers speak the same language
that they do (S21 ).
In most cases, the stock returns from investing in familiar stocks are not higher than unfa-
miliar ones, so the home bias is consistent with a pure distaste for betting on ambiguous foreign
or faraway assets (as in our Knowledge treatment).
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Figure S1: Boxplots of log response times (secs) of choice by condition and 
treatment. Response times are logged due to skewness of the distribution.  Boxplots 
show that there are no significant differences between choices and between conditions 
across the treatments. 
 
 Figure S2: Choices of subjects across treatment and condition. Average of number 
and standard error bars of certain payoff choice by subjects across condition and 
treatment (out of 24 total choices per condition per treatment). A higher frequency of 
choosing the certain payoff in the ambiguity treatment (compared to the frequency in the 
risk treatment) is an indicator of ambiguity aversion. 
 
 
 Figure S3: Treatment specific HRFs, Ambiguity > Risk. Time courses of percentage 
signal change in brain regions that are differentially activated in decision making under 
ambiguity in Card-Deck, Knowledge, and Informed Opponent conditions. Note that the 
effect ambiguity > risk is observed in each of the areas. Furthermore, the qualitative 
aspects of the activation and differences between ambiguity and risk are preserved 
between the pooled HRFs (Fig. 2b) and the above HRFs. Axes are the same as in the text 
Figures. 
  
Figure S4: Treatment specific HRFs, Risk > Ambiguity. Time courses of percentage 
signal change in brain regions that are differentially activated in decision making under 
risk in Card-Deck, Knowledge, and Informed Opponent conditions.  Note that the effect 
risk > ambiguity is observed in each of the areas. Furthermore, that the qualitative aspects 
of the activation and differences between ambiguity and risk are preserved between the 
pooled HRFs (Fig. 3b) and the above HRFs. Axes are the same as in the text Figures. 
 
 
 Figure S5: Decision-synched HRFs. Hemodynamic responses of regions of interest 
synched at decision epoch at t = 0 (dotted gray line), blue vertical line indicates mean 
trial onset. 
 
 Figure S6: Pooled HRFs separated by condition (ambiguity versus risk) and actual 
choice (gamble versus certain). Note that no consistent differential activation can be 
observed between choices (gamble vs. certain). 
 Figure S7: Mean time to peak hemodynamic response. Peaks are defined as the mean 
time (in seconds, measured from trial onset) to the maximum BOLD response observed, 
across subjects and conditions.  Time window is defined as in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 (16 secs).  
Note that the peaks for the left and right striatum occur significantly later than those of 
the amygdala and OFC, with the exception of the L OFC in the ambiguity condition.  
Stars denote the significance level of t-tests on whether the time to peak for the amygdala 
and OFC regions occur significantly later than those of the striatal regions of the same 
laterality and condition (all tests 2-tailed, p < 0.1: *, p < 0.05: **, p < 0.01: ***). 
 Figure S8: Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) activation under ambiguity 
relative to risk (at p < 0.001, uncorrected, cluster k > 10 voxels). 
Table S1: Parameters and Data for Card-Deck Treatment. “# Total Cards” is the 
number of cards in the deck. “# Blue Cards” and “# Red Cards” are the numbers of each 
color card in the risky deck (total number of cards is the sum of the numbers of blue and 
red cards). “Gamble” and “Certain” are dollar payoffs for the gamble and the certain 
payoff, respectively. “% Certain Choice” is the percentage of fMRI subjects who chose 
the certain payoff rather than the gamble in each row. 
Condition # Total Cards Gamble Certain % Certain Choice 
Ambiguous 15 24 11 68.75 
Ambiguous 7 28 16 43.75 
Ambiguous 30 27 12 37.50 
Ambiguous 20 17 6 25.00 
Ambiguous 40 18 9 68.75 
Ambiguous 7 28 15 62.50 
Ambiguous 38 23 8 31.25 
Ambiguous 25 26 8 37.50 
Ambiguous 15 26 15 81.25 
Ambiguous 6 24 9 25.00 
Ambiguous 25 17 9 50.00 
Ambiguous 2 22 7 6.25 
Ambiguous 15 28 15 62.50 
Ambiguous 35 28 15 56.25 
Ambiguous 20 27 8 31.25 
Ambiguous 34 20 11 81.25 
Ambiguous 10 29 17 73.33 
Ambiguous 4 22 9 20.00 
Ambiguous 30 22 12 73.33 
Ambiguous 1 28 14 60.00 
Ambiguous 40 25 10 46.67 
Ambiguous 15 23 9 20.00 
Ambiguous 19 30 17 60.00 
Ambiguous 9 28 10 6.67 
Condition # Blue Cards # Red Cards Gamble Certain % Certain Choice 
Risk 10 15 16 7 6.25 
Risk 5 10 23 13 0.00 
Risk 20 10 23 13 25.00 
Risk 6 10 27 16 68.75 
Risk 2 10 22 17 25.00 
Risk 1 5 30 20 37.50 
Risk 15 10 17 11 75.00 
Risk 10 20 25 12 31.25 
Risk 20 2 18 14 50.00 
Risk 1 5 23 20 62.50 
Risk 8 15 16 10 56.25 
Risk 1 3 30 21 43.75 
Risk 5 10 26 16 50.00 
Risk 2 5 19 15 100.00 
Risk 1 3 17 13 50.00 
Risk 10 5 17 11 25.00 
Risk 8 10 29 14 33.33 
Risk 1 5 26 17 40.00 
Risk 10 5 17 11 33.33 
Risk 15 20 23 11 40.00 
Risk 20 2 23 18 33.33 
Risk 1 5 21 14 26.67 
Risk 10 5 20 10 6.67 
Risk 9 1 27 18 0.00 
 
Table S2: Parameters and Data for Knowledge Treatment. “Gamble” and “Certain” 
are dollar payoffs for the gamble and the certain payoff, respectively. “% Certain Choice” 
is the percentage of fMRI subjects who chose the certain payoff rather than the gamble in 
each row. 
Condition Question Gamble Certain 
% 
Certain 
Choice 
Ambiguity 
The high temperature in Dushanbe, 
Tajikistan on November 7, 2003 was 
above 50 Fahrenheit. 15 6 43.75 
Ambiguity 
The high temperature in Tirana, 
Albania on March 19, 2002 was above 
50 Fahrenheit. 23 6 6.25 
Ambiguity 
The high temperature in Rhodes, 
Greece on November 17 2003 was 
above 60 Fahrenheit. 18 9 43.75 
Ambiguity 
The high temperature in Hiroshima, 
Japan on November 17 2003 was 
above 50 Fahrenheit. 24 11 50.00 
Ambiguity 
Montpelier, VT. has the smallest 
population (2000 Census) amongst the 
state capitals. 21 10 68.75 
Ambiguity 
The population of the Mauritius (2003) 
is greater than 1 million. 18 11 68.75 
Ambiguity 
The population of Saskatchewan, 
Canada (2001 Census) is greater than 
1 million. 15 6 25.00 
Ambiguity 
The population of Tallapoosa County, 
Alabama (2000 Census) is greater than 
40,000. 20 6 12.50 
Ambiguity Andorra is bigger than Moldova 16 4 12.50 
Ambiguity 
Saint Kitts and Nevis is the smallest 
country in the Western Hemisphere?  19 6 18.75 
Ambiguity Lesotho is a larger (area) than Qatar. 18 6 18.75 
Ambiguity 
Burkina Faso is larger (area) than 
Guyana. 18 7 25.00 
Ambiguity 
The closing price of Paxar Corp on Nov 
14, 2003 is above $15. 24 8 18.75 
Ambiguity 
The closing price of Cornell Companies 
on Nov 14, 2003 is above $10 16 6 31.25 
Ambiguity 
The closing price of Stride-Rite on Nov 
14, 2003 is above $10 25 10 31.25 
Ambiguity 
The closing price of WhiteHall Jewelers 
on Nov 14, 2003 is above $10 22 7 6.25 
Ambiguity 
Ron Hunt was hit by a pitch more than 
40 times in a season. 18 8 37.50 
Ambiguity 
Jumpin'' Joe Fulks was a 3 time All-Star 
between 1946 and 1954. 21 11 93.75 
Ambiguity 
Hal Bagwell holds the boxing record for 
most consecutive wins without a loss. 20 12 75.00 
Ambiguity 
Wesley Person was a second team all 
rookie. 25 13 93.75 
Ambiguity 
Marcantonio Raimondi was born in 
Siena. 25 7 6.25 
Ambiguity Ferdinand Bol painted Jacob's Dream 16 6 25.00 
Ambiguity 
Robert Clark was the real name of 
Robert Indiana. 25 8 12.50 
Ambiguity 
Georg Gross's middle name was 
Heinrich 25 10 12.50 
Risk 
The high temperature in New York City, 
NY on November 6, 2001 was above 60 
Fahrenheit. 17 5 12.50 
Risk 
The high temperature in Los Angeles, 
California on November 16, 2001 was 
above 60 Fahrenheit. 25 10 6.25 
Risk 
The high temperature in San Francisco, 
California on November 16, 2001 was 
above 60 Fahrenheit. 21 7 12.50 
Risk 
The high temperature in Washington 
DC on November 16, 2001 was above 
60 Fahrenheit. 19 8 31.25 
Risk 
The population of the United States 
(2000 census) is greater than 270 
million. 18 13 43.75 
Risk 
The population of Texas (2000 census) 
is greater than 25 million. 19 9 37.50 
Risk 
The population of the New York City 
(2000 census) is greater than 8 million. 18 9 18.75 
Risk 
The population of Los Angeles County 
(2000 census) is greater than 10 
million. 25 13 37.50 
Risk Michigan is larger (area) than Utah. 24 7 0.00 
Risk 
Arkansas is larger (area) than New 
York. 20 8 6.25 
Risk 
New Mexico is larger (area) than 
Arizona. 18 11 68.75 
Risk Georgia is larger (area) than Illinois. 17 5 18.75 
Risk 
The closing price of Microsoft on Nov 
14, 2003 is above $25. 25 8 6.25 
Risk 
The closing price of IBM on Nov 14, 
2003 is above $90. 15 6 25.00 
Risk 
The closing price of Coca-cola on Nov 
14, 2003 is above $50. 22 11 68.75 
Risk 
The closing price of Ford Motors on Nov 
14, 2003 is above $15. 20 6 6.25 
Risk Babe Ruth was born before 1900. 18 8 18.75 
Risk Michael Jordan played in more than 21 8 18.75 
1,200 games in the NBA 
Risk 
Muhammad Ali won his first title after 
the 8th round. 15 6 18.75 
Risk 
Kobe Bryant's career high in points 
scored in a game is more than 60 
points 22 11 37.50 
Risk Andy Warhol was Czech-American 17 8 25.00 
Risk Pablo Picasso's middle name was Ruiz 17 11 75.00 
Risk Rembrandt was born in Leiden 23 10 31.25 
Risk Michelangelo attended Seminary school 16 5 0.00 
 
Table S3: Parameters for Informed Opponents Treatment. “# Total Cards” and “# 
Opponents Draw” are the number of cards in the ambiguous deck, and the number that an 
opponent drew, looked at, and replaced.  “Gamble” and “Certain” are dollar payoffs for 
the gamble and the certain payoff, respectively. “% Certain Choice” is the percentage of 
fMRI subjects who chose the certain payoff rather than the gamble in each row. 
EV(binom) and EV(unif) are, respectively, the expected value of the gamble given a 
binomial or uniform prior over the composition of the deck (S5). 
Condition 
# 
Total 
Cards 
# 
Opponents 
Draw Gamble Certain 
% 
Certain 
Choice 
EV 
(binom) 
EV 
(unif) 
Ambiguity 11 3 31 7 23.08 10.19 7.59 
Ambiguity 18 3 36 6 0 11.25 8.00 
Ambiguity 12 2 37 12 69.23 14.48 11.65 
Ambiguity 17 3 30 8 84.62 10.84 8.15 
Ambiguity 18 9 30 8 92.31 10.47 7.71 
Ambiguity 10 5 36 15 84.62 14.81 11.87 
Ambiguity 15 1 33 9 23.08 12.20 9.63 
Ambiguity 13 5 29 5 38.46 8.70 6.16 
Ambiguity 9 3 33 6 7.69 9.88 7.22 
Ambiguity 14 3 33 6 0 10.37 7.48 
Ambiguity 15 7 39 8 53.85 12.33 8.84 
Ambiguity 3 1 33 7 7.69 9.00 7.17 
Ambiguity 8 1 36 8 0 11.88 9.25 
Ambiguity 6 3 39 9 46.15 11.81 9.05 
Ambiguity 4 1 36 10 30.77 11.75 9.50 
Ambiguity 16 7 30 5 38.46 8.97 6.25 
Ambiguity 16 5 30 7 46.15 10.12 7.38 
Ambiguity 11 4 28 8 84.62 10.05 7.69 
Ambiguity 24 5 28 9 84.62 10.95 8.25 
Ambiguity 19 5 35 11 100 13.39 10.11 
Ambiguity 20 9 34 7 30.77 10.95 7.75 
Ambiguity 9 3 30 5 30.77 8.75 6.33 
Ambiguity 4 1 34 8 46.15 10.38 8.25 
Ambiguity 11 4 29 5 38.46 8.76 6.32 
Risk 24 0 24 6 0 9.00 9.00 
Risk 7 0 28 10 15.38 12.00 12.00 
Risk 7 0 21 6 0 8.25 8.25 
Risk 10 0 22 8 7.69 9.50 9.50 
Risk 21 0 18 11 76.92 10.00 10.00 
Risk 12 0 28 11 7.69 12.50 12.50 
Risk 19 0 22 10 46.15 10.50 10.50 
Risk 6 0 24 11 30.77 11.50 11.50 
Risk 12 0 23 7 0 9.25 9.25 
Risk 8 0 26 10 7.69 11.50 11.50 
Risk 17 0 18 9 84.62 9.00 9.00 
Risk 12 0 25 7 0 9.75 9.75 
Risk 19 0 26 8 0 10.50 10.50 
Risk 18 0 24 9 0 10.50 10.50 
Risk 17 0 22 10 53.85 10.50 10.50 
Risk 7 0 28 8 0 11.00 11.00 
Risk 8 0 23 9 0 10.25 10.25 
Risk 13 0 22 8 0 9.50 9.50 
Risk 24 0 18 7 15.38 8.00 8.00 
Risk 25 0 21 10 92.31 10.25 10.25 
Risk 8 0 22 5 0 8.00 8.00 
Risk 6 0 26 9 7.69 11.00 11.00 
Risk 17 0 26 13 84.62 13.00 13.00 
Risk 12 0 21 8 15.38 9.25 9.25 
 
Table S4: Summary of mean response times (secs) of choices across treatments. 
  
Ambiguity 
 
Ambiguity 
Total 
Risk 
 
Risk 
Total 
Grand 
Total 
Treatment Certain Gamble   Certain Gamble     
Card-Deck 4.88 5.67 5.30 8.45 6.30 7.13 6.22 
Knowledge 7.53 8.29 8.03 6.03 7.32 6.98 7.51 
Informed Opp. 5.39 5.93 5.69 5.40 3.54 3.96 4.83 
Grand Total 5.83 6.80 6.39 7.00 5.80 6.16 6.27 
 
Table S5: Summary of subject choices across treatment and condition.  Average 
number of certain payoff choices by subjects across conditions and treatments (out of 24 
total choices per condition per treatment).  
Condition/Treatment Card-Deck Knowledge Informed Opp. Grand Total 
Ambiguity 11.56 8.37 10.61 10.15 
Risk 9.56 6.25 5.46 7.20 
Ambiguity – Risk 2.00 2.12 5.15 2.95 
 
Table S6: Ambiguity aversion estimates. Separate estimates (standard errors) of the 
ambiguity aversion coefficient γ, risk aversion coefficient ρ, and inflection parameter λ 
for subjects in the Card-Deck and Knowledge Conditions. 
Card-Deck Knowledge Subject 
γ ρ λ γ ρ λ 
AJB 0.98 1.00 1.39 1.11 1.13 0.71 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.63) (0.15) (0.12) (0.41) 
APS 0.80 0.90 4.32 1.66 1.44 0.10 
  (0.04) (0.04) (1.92) (0.57) (0.48) (0.18) 
BIC 0.81 0.73 1.81 1.05 0.63 1.37 
  (0.11) (0.08) (0.73) (0.22) (0.11) (0.60) 
BSU 1.20 0.73 9.98 1.09 1.07 0.51 
  (0.10) (0.04) (4.82) (0.19) (0.15) (0.34) 
CSJ 0.93 0.87 3.85 1.30 1.50 0.10 
  (0.07) (0.04) (1.50) (0.46) (0.71) (0.26) 
DAS 0.84 0.85 0.85 1.70 1.29 0.10 
  (0.19) (0.18) (0.81) (1.13) (0.84) (0.33) 
EJH 0.82 0.83 1.39 1.09 1.05 0.64 
  (0.12) (0.10) (0.67) (0.17) (0.13) (0.39) 
HCH 0.55 0.52 6.65 1.52 1.25 1.43 
  (0.08) (0.06) (2.64) (0.12) (0.10) (0.89) 
KED 1.03 1.05 3.98 1.19 1.27 0.48 
  (0.05) (0.04) (1.67) (0.18) (0.17) (0.33) 
LTL 0.98 1.02 0.80 1.07 0.89 2.13 
  (0.15) (0.14) (0.55) (0.09) (0.05) (0.78) 
MK 1.12 1.01 0.85 1.30 1.37 0.10 
  (0.16) (0.13) (0.52) (0.45) (0.55) (0.21) 
PRV 1.22 1.13 1.22 1.33 1.47 0.33 
  (0.14) (0.12) (0.69) (0.23) (0.22) (0.26) 
SWT 0.81 0.58 5.01 1.10 0.70 10.16 
  (0.09) (0.05) (1.56) (0.06) (0.03) (3.77) 
TEJ 0.84 0.79 5.35 1.49 1.36 0.26 
  (0.06) (0.03) (1.83) (0.26) (0.22) (0.21) 
VS 1.19 1.22 0.63 1.42 1.50 0.15 
  (0.19) (0.18) (0.51) (0.27) (0.26) (0.14) 
WL 0.85 0.83 1.11 1.88 1.38 0.18 
  (0.13) (0.10) (0.59) (0.41) (0.27) (0.18) 
Mean est. 0.94 0.88 3.07 1.33 1.21 1.17 
Mean s.e. (0.11) (0.09) (1.35) (0.31) (0.28) (0.58) 
 
Table S7: Ambiguity > Risk regions. Local maxima of clusters, p < 0.001 uncorrected, 
clusters with k < 10 voxels not shown (All local maxima uncorrected p-values are 
significant to three significant figures, and are omitted from the table.) 
cluster voxel Regions 
pcor1 kE2 punc3 pFWE4 pFDR5 T6 Z7 X8 Y Z L/R9 Region 
0.01 82 0.001 0.011 0.007 5.96 5.04 51 33 -6 R Lateral Orbitofrontal Cortex 
   0.897 0.017 3.92 3.6 54 18 -21   
0 109 0 0.052 0.007 5.38 4.67 -54 -60 42 L Inferior Parietal Lobule 
   0.1 0.007 5.13 4.5 -45 -54 33   
0 112 0 0.06 0.007 5.33 4.63 -9 48 39 L Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex 
   0.306 0.008 4.66 4.16 -12 63 21   
0 119 0 0.072 0.007 5.26 4.59 54 -54 36 R Supramarginal Gyrus 
   0.599 0.01 4.3 3.89 54 -63 30   
0 226 0 0.162 0.007 4.94 4.36 18 54 18 R Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex 
   0.229 0.008 4.79 4.26 12 54 30   
   0.379 0.009 4.56 4.09 12 27 57   
0.06 52 0.007 0.201 0.008 4.85 4.3 36 18 42 R Middle Frontal Gyrus 
   0.884 0.016 3.94 3.62 42 9 45   
0 154 0 0.22 0.008 4.81 4.27 60 -36 -3 R Middle Temporal Gyrus 
   0.485 0.009 4.43 3.99 63 -27 -6   
   0.626 0.01 4.27 3.87 51 -24 -9   
0.44 21 0.066 0.302 0.008 4.67 4.17 -39 -9 -15 L Sub-Gyral 
0.13 40 0.015 0.331 0.009 4.63 4.14 39 6 -27 R Frontoinsular Cortex 
   0.951 0.019 3.8 3.5 42 15 -24   
0.41 22 0.061 0.547 0.01 4.36 3.94 54 27 6  Lateral Orbitofrontal Cortex 
0.26 29 0.034 0.584 0.01 4.32 3.91 -54 36 -6 L Lateral Orbitofrontal Cortex 
0.74 12 0.154 0.75 0.013 4.13 3.76 -15 -15 -15 L Amygdala/Parahippocampal Gyrus 
   0.993 0.026 3.57 3.32 -21 -6 -18 L Amygdala 
0.41 22 0.061 0.825 0.014 4.03 3.69 33 -6 -27 R Amygdala/Parahippocampal Gyrus 
 
                                                
1 Corrected (family-wise) cluster-level p-value. 
2 Cluster size (voxels). 
3 Uncorrected cluster-level p-value. 
4 Corrected (family-wise) voxel-level p-value. 
5 Corrected (false-discovery rate) voxel-level p-value. 
6 T-statistic of voxel. 
7 Z-score of voxel. 
8 (X, Y, Z) are the MNI coordinate of voxel location (mm). 
9 Laterality (L = left, R = right). 
Table S8: Risk>Ambiguity regions. Local maxima of clusters, p < 0.001 uncorrected, 
clusters with k < 10 voxels not shown (All local maxima uncorrected p-values are 
significant to three significant figures, and are omitted from the table.) 
cluster voxel Regions 
pcor kE punc pFWE pFDR T Z X Y Z L/R Region 
0.06 52 0.007 0.063 0.012 5.31 4.62 0 -6 6 M Caudate 
   0.993 0.033 3.57 3.32 9 6 6 R  
   0.952 0.023 3.79 3.5 -12 6 0 L  
0 641 0 0.07 0.012 5.27 4.59 12 -60 -3 R Culmen 
   0.119 0.012 5.07 4.45 9 -78 3 R Lingual Gyrus 
   0.162 0.012 4.94 4.36 -12 -75 15 L Cuneus 
0.01 81 0.001 0.295 0.012 4.68 4.18 -15 -72 51 L Precuneus 
0.26 29 0.034 0.338 0.012 4.62 4.13 -3 9 45 L Precentral Gyrus 
0.12 41 0.014 0.569 0.012 4.33 3.92 12 -75 51 R Precuneus 
   0.906 0.02 3.9 3.58 21 -84 39   
0.74 12 0.154 0.923 0.021 3.87 3.56 -42 -75 30 L Angular Gyrus 
 
Table S9: Gamble>Certain regions: Local maxima of clusters, p < 0.001 uncorrected, 
clusters with k < 10 voxels not shown (All local maxima uncorrected). 
cluster voxel Regions 
pcor kE punc pFWE pFDR T Z punc X Y Z L/R Region 
0 129 0 0.01 0.005 5.47 5.04 0 18 -78 -12 R Occipital Cortex 
   0.998 0.121 3.37 3.26 0.001 0 -81 -3   
0.037 54 0.004 0.398 0.041 4.31 4.09 0 -9 -21 48 L Medial Frontal Gyrus 
   0.609 0.057 4.1 3.91 0 -18 -12 51 L Brodman Area 6 
0.122 37 0.013 0.781 0.072 3.93 3.76 0 -30 -27 54 L  Precentral Gyrus 
0.639 14 0.104 0.88 0.088 3.81 3.65 0 -33 15 21 L  Insula 
0.76 11 0.146 0.891 0.089 3.8 3.64 0 -6 15 -3 L  Caudate head 
0.72 12 0.13 0.947 0.095 3.69 3.54 0 15 -90 12 R BrodmanArea18 
0.72 12 0.13 0.982 0.104 3.57 3.43 0 33 6 21 R  Insula 
   0.999 0.124 3.33 3.21 0.001 27 12 21   
0.562 16 0.084 0.997 0.12 3.41 3.29 0 -51 -66 6 L  Middle Temporal Gyrus 
   0.999 0.124 3.33 3.21 0.001 -51 -57 3     
 
Table S10: Certain>Gamble regions: Local maxima of clusters, p < 0.001 uncorrected, 
clusters with k < 10 voxels not shown (All local maxima uncorrected). 
cluster voxel Regions 
pcor kE punc pFWE pFDR T Z punc X Y Z L/R Region 
0.001 122 0 0.008 0.003 5.56 5.11 0 42 -24 60  R   Precentral Gyrus  
0.012 72 0.001 0.008 0.003 5.56 5.11 0 -15 -75 9  L   Occipital Cortex  
 
Table S11: Regions positively correlated with expected value of decisions in risk 
condition of Card-Deck treatment.  Local maxima of clusters, p < 0.005 uncorrected, 
clusters with k < 10 voxels not shown (All local maxima uncorrected).    
cluster voxel Regions 
pcor kE punc pFWE pFDR T Z punc X Y Z L/R Region 
0.002 120 0 0.089 0.089 7.11 4.64 0 9 24 54 R Superior Frontal Gyrus 
                      0.994 0.397 4.85 3.71 0 12 39 51   
                      1 0.397 4.47 3.51 0 9 12 54   
0.429 36 0.01 0.32 0.16 6.36 4.36 0 60 -33 3 R Middle Temporal Gyrus 
                      1 0.397 3.31 2.82 0.002 57 -42 3   
0.844 23 0.032 0.781 0.314 5.76 4.12 0 -51 -72 30 L Angular Gyrus 
                      1 0.397 3.99 3.24 0.001 -42 -78 33   
1 10 0.139 0.991 0.397 4.92 3.74 0 -66 -30 -9 L Middle Temporal Gyrus 
0.487 34 0.012 0.996 0.397 4.81 3.68 0 -9 -18 18   
   1 0.397 4.16 3.34 0 -9 -3 18   
0.403 37 0.009 1 0.397 4.55 3.55 0 15 6 3 R Caudate 
0.041 70 0.001 1 0.397 4.37 3.46 0 48 24 -15 R Inferior Frontal Gyrus 
                      1 0.397 3.67 3.05 0.001 54 39 -3 R Brodman Area 47 
                      1 0.397 3.54 2.97 0.001 39 24 -15   
0.783 25 0.026 1 0.397 4.21 3.37 0 -9 45 9 L Anterior Cingular Gyrus 
0.549 32 0.014 1 0.397 3.99 3.24 0.001 -3 57 33 L Brodman Area 9 
                      1 0.397 3.87 3.17 0.001 -9 39 30   
                      1 0.397 3.46 2.92 0.002 -6 48 27   
0.999 11 0.122 1 0.397 3.95 3.22 0.001 3 -42 -6 M Culmen 
0.897 21 0.039 1 0.397 3.85 3.16 0.001 60 -57 30 R Supramarginal Gyrus 
                    1 0.397 3.73 3.09 0.001 60 -51 39   
0.999 11 0.122 1 0.397 3.84 3.16 0.001 -6 27 42 L Brodman Area 6 
1 10 0.139 1 0.397 3.74 3.1 0.001 -45 42 6 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus 
1 10 0.139 1 0.397 3.43 2.9 0.002 21 48 27 R Superior Frontal Gyrus 
                    1 0.397 3.38 2.87 0.002 18 57 33   
 
Table S12: Regions positively correlated with expected value of decisions in 
Knowledge treatment.  Local maxima of clusters, p < 0.005 uncorrected, clusters with 
k<10 voxels not shown (All local maxima uncorrected).    
cluster voxel region 
pcor kE punc pFWE pFDR T Z punc X Y Z L/R Region 
0.782 41 0.06 0.417 0.741 5.88 4.17 0 33 -87 15 R Middle Occipital Gyrus 
                     1 0.93 3.53 2.96 0.002 39 -84 9   
0.995 17 0.21 0.998 0.93 4.08 3.3 0 -9 12 3 L Caudate 
                     1 0.93 3.24 2.78 0.003 -6 3 6   
1 10 0.334 1 0.93 3.69 3.06 0.001 -24 -63 51 L Superior Parietal Lobule 
Table S13: Cross correlation (p-values) of pooled contrast values (each subject 
contributes one data point) between regions (ambiguity-risk contrast for amygdala and 
OFC; risk-ambiguity contrast for dorsal striatum). Note that since the contrasts are 
opposite for amygdala-OFC and striatum, positive correlations actually represents 
negative correlation in activity. 
 R Amyg L Amyg R OFC L OFC R DMPFC R DMPFC R DStr L DStr 
R Amyg        
 
- 
       
L Amyg 0.33       
 (0.21) 
- 
      
R OFC 0.22 0.00      
 (0.42) (0.99) 
- 
     
L OFC 0.03 0.15 0.38     
 (0.91) (0.58) (0.14) 
- 
    
R DMPFC 0.35 -0.10 0.76 0.58    
 (0.18) (0.73) (0.00) (0.02) 
- 
   
R DMPFC 0.23 0.12 0.46 0.09 0.56   
 (0.38) (0.65) (0.07) (0.73) (0.03) 
- 
  
R DStr -0.11 0.00 0.13 0.31 0.24 -0.31  
 (0.69) (1.00) (0.63) (0.24) (0.37) (0.24) 
- 
 
L DStr -0.22 -0.16 0.14 0.61 0.08 -0.31 0.33 
 (0.40) (0.55) (0.59) (0.01) (0.76) (0.24) (0.22) 
- 
Table S14: Summary of lesion patient choices. Proportion of patients choosing certain 
amount x when choosing between a gamble for 0 or 100 points versus x.  In the ambiguity 
condition, the deck is of unknown composition of red and black cards. In the risk 
condition, the deck is known to contain 50 red cards and 50 black cards. Higher 
proportion of certain choices suggests greater risk/ambiguity aversion.  A population of 
deterministic risk-neutral subjects would have proportions of 0, 0, 0, 0, 1. 
Lesion   Certain Amt   Ambiguity   Risk  
Control 15 0.2857 0 
 25 0.2857 0.1429 
 30 0.5714 0.2857 
 40 0.7143 0.5714 
 60 0.7143 0.8571 
OFC 15 0 0 
 25 0 0 
 30 0 0 
 40 0.2 0.2 
 60 0.4 0.6 
 
Table S15: Lesion patient performance measures: Means (standard deviations) of 
VIQ, PIQ, FSIQ:  verbal performance and full scale IQ from the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Test III or Revised. MATH: from the WRAT-R arithmetic subtest. 
MEMORY: from the Wechsler Memory Scale 3, general memory index. WCST:  
Wisconsin card sorting task (number of categories successfully sorted). 
    OFC       Control    t-statistic 
Age      54 52 0.31 
         (12) (9)  
VIQ      110 100 1.00 
         (21) (9)  
PIQ      117 100 2.35 
         (11) (14)  
FSIQ  114 100 1.65 
         (17) (10)  
MATH     102 98 0.71 
         (10) (9)  
WCST     6 4.9 1.45 
         (0) (2)  
MEMORY   106 100 1.09 
         (7) (12)  
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1 Instructions
This is an experiment on decision making. If you follow the instructions and
make good decisions you could earn a significant amount of money. The experi-
ment will consist of three rounds. Each round consists of a sequence of choices.
In each choice, you choose between a sure amount of money and a gamble which
pays an amount of money that depends on a draw of a card, or an event which
happened. At the end of the experiment, one of the choices from each round will
be chosen at random by drawing a numbered card from a deck. If the number
12 is chosen, for example, then the 12th choice will be used to determine your
payment for that round. If you chose the sure amount in that round, you will
earn that sure amount. If you chose the gamble in that round, the gamble will
be played (or you will be told which event happened), which will determine how
much money you earn. There will be 3 rounds.
2 Round 1
In this round you will make a series of choices between a gamble with an uncer-
tain payoff, and a certain payoff. A sample screen is as follows
The numbers in the box on top of the cards show the number of cards in a
deck. In the example on the left there are 10 red cards and 10 blue cards. The
dollar amount underneath the cards shows the amount you earn if the color you
choose is the same as the color of the card which is actually drawn, at the end
of the experiment. In the example on the left you would earn $10 if you choose
the gamble, and choose the correct card color, and you would earn $3 if you
choose the sure amount on the right.
Sometimes you will not know the exact numbers of cards of different colors.
Instead, you will only know the total number of cards; you will not know how
many cards are of each color. The example screen on the right shows this
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situation. The box at the top of the screen shows that there are a total of 20
cards, but you do not know how many red or blue cards there are.
In each choice in this round, you should choose between the red card, blue
card, or certain payoff. At the end of experiment, one of these trials will be
selected at random and played for money. If you chose the gamble, the gamble
will be played with a deck of cards. Suppose that the screen on the left was
chosen. There will then be 10 red cards and 10 blue cards (you may verify this).
A random card will be chosen. If your choice in that round matches the card
chosen, you will earn $10. If your choice is the opposite of the actual card color
chosen, you earn $0.
Suppose that the screen on the right was chosen. There will be 20 cards of
either blue or red cards (you can verify the composition afterwards). A random
card will be chosen. If your choice in that round matches the card chosen, you
will earn $10. If your choice is the opposite of the actual card color chosen, you
earn $0.
If you chose the certain outcome in the examples above, you will earn $3.
Note that the numbers of cards, and the dollar amounts you can earn, will
be different in different choices within the round.
3 Round 2
In this round you will also choose between answering ”Yes” or ”No” to a knowl-
edge question, which pays a dollar amount if your answer is correct, and receiv-
ing a certain payoff. Here is a sample screen:
At the end of the experiment, one of the choices in this round will also be
selected at random and played. If you choose to answer the knowledge question,
you will be paid according to whether your answer is correct. In the choice
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above, the correct answer is ”No”. You would earn $10 if you answered No, and
$0 if you answered Yes.
If you chose the certain outcome, you will receive $3.
4 Round 3
The choices in round 3 are similar to those in round 1, because they involve red
and blue cards. However, in the choices in this round you will be competing
with another person. The other person will draw a batch of cards at random,
look at the color of the cards, and return them to the deck. A number at the
top of the screen will tell you how many cards your opponent has drawn. In
the example screen below, your opponent will draw a group of 3 cards, all at
once. In this example, there are 20 cards which are red and black, but you do
not know how many cards of each color there are. Since your opponent will
have drawn a batch of three cards, the opponent may have a better idea of the
number of cards of each color than you do.
After your opponent has seen the colors of the cards in the batch, and
returned the cards to the deck, your opponent will choose whether to bet on
red or blue. If you choose to bet on red or blue, rather than take the certain
amount on the right side of the screen, then your bet will only take place if the
opponent chose the opposite color to the one you chose. For the sample screen
above, suppose your opponent saw a batch of 3 cards and then chose ”red”. If
you choose red as well, then the bet will not take place because you chose the
same color as your opponent did. Then you will both earn the certain amount
of $3 instead. If you choose the opposite color of your opponent– blue, in this
example– then the bet will take place. Then you earn $15 if the actual card
chosen is blue, and you earn $0 if the actual card chosen is red.
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5 Review
The experiment consists of three (3) rounds. Within each round, you will be
making several choices. The questions in each round have different numbers
of red and blue cards, or different knowledge questions, and different money
payoffs. are different. At the end of the round, you will randomly choose an
index card from a numbered deck. The number on the card will determine which
choice will be used to determine your payment. Three numbers will be chosen,
one for each of the three rounds.
In the first round, in each choice you will either play a gamble by drawing a
card out of a deck, or receive a fixed payment. The card deck’s composition and
monetary payoff is specified on the screen. In the second round, you will either
play a gamble by answering a knowledge question or receive a fixed payment. In
the third round, you will play against an opponent who will draw a number of
cards from the deck, look at them, then return them to the deck If you choose a
card color, your bet will only count if the opponent chooses the opposite color.
6 Quiz
1. If I choose red in round 1, and a blue card is drawn, I earn $0 in that choice.
(circle one) True False
2. In round 3, another person will see a batch of cards that I will not see.
(circle one) True False
3. In round 3, if the opponent chooses the same color as I did, the bet will
still take place (circle one) True False
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